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Abstract
We construct universal prediction systems in the spirit of Popper’s fal-
sifiability and Kolmogorov complexity and randomness. These prediction
systems do not depend on any statistical assumptions (but under the IID
assumption they dominate, to within the usual accuracy, conformal pre-
diction). Our constructions give rise to a theory of algorithmic complexity
and randomness of time containing analogues of several notions and re-
sults of the classical theory of Kolmogorov complexity and randomness.
The conference version of this paper has been published in the Proceedings
of COPA 2016. The journal version is to appear in the Special Issue of
the Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence devoted to COPA
2016. The version at http://alrw.net (Working Paper 14) is updated most
often.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the problem of predicting the labels, assumed to be
binary, of a sequence of objects. This is an online version of the standard prob-
lem of binary classiﬁcation. Namely, we will be interested in inﬁnite sequences
of observations
ω = (z1, z2, . . .) = ((x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . .) ∈ (X× 2)
∞
(also called infinite data sequences), where X is an object space and 2 := {0, 1}
is the label space. For simplicity, we will assume that the object space X is a
given ﬁnite set of, say, binary strings (the intuition being that ﬁnite objects can
always be encoded as binary strings). The elements 1 and 0 of the label space
are often interpreted as “true” and “false”.
Finite sequences σ ∈ (X × 2)∗ of observations will be called finite data
sequences. If σ1, σ2 are two ﬁnite data sequences, their concatenation will be
denoted (σ1, σ2); σ2 is also allowed to be an element of X × 2. A standard
partial order on (X × 2)∗ is deﬁned as follows: σ1 ⊑ σ2 means that σ1 is a
preﬁx of σ2; σ1 ❁ σ2 means that σ1 ⊑ σ2 and σ1 6= σ2. The smallest element
in this order (the empty data sequence) is denoted ✷. We say that ﬁnite data
sequences σ1 and σ2 are comparable if σ1 ⊑ σ2 or σ2 ⊑ σ1.
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We use the notation N := {1, 2, . . .} for the set of positive integers and
N0 := {0, 1, 2, . . .} for the set of nonnegative integers. The length of a ﬁnite
data sequence σ is the number l ∈ N0 such that σ ∈ (X× 2)l. If ω ∈ (X× 2)∞
and l ∈ N0, ωl ∈ (X× 2)l is the preﬁx of ω of length l.
We will also use the notation σ1 ⊑ σ2 and |σ| for ﬁnite binary sequences
σ1, σ2, σ ∈ 2∗.
A situation is a concatenation (σ, x) ∈ (X×2)∗×X of a ﬁnite data sequence
σ and an object x; our task in the situation (σ, x) is to be able to predict the
label of the new object x given the sequence σ of labelled objects. Given a
situation s = (σ, x) and a label y ∈ 2, we let (s, y) stand for the ﬁnite data
sequence (σ, (x, y)), which is the concatenation of s and y.
Our notation for binary logarithm will be log.
The contents of this paper
This paper is, to some degree, a result of our attempts to understand the philo-
sophical problem of prediction. It has two components, philosophical and math-
ematical, and the latter is more or less independent of the former. The main
goal of the remainder of this section is to provide a road map for our mathe-
matical readers who do not share our philosophy of science, so that the latter
does not get in their way. The four key mathematical concepts introduced in
this paper are:
• universal prediction system (Sections 2–6),
• time complexity (Sections 6–7),
• a priori time semimeasure (Section 8),
• time randomness (Section 9).
In the remaining sections we will explore (rather superﬁcially) various connec-
tions between these key concepts.
We start from a toy formalization of the philosophical notion of a law of
nature in Section 2 and the most basic way of using laws of nature for prediction
in Section 3. The notion of a strong prediction system introduced in Section 3
has only philosophical interest in this paper, and this section can be safely
skipped by our mathematical readers. The notion of a weak prediction system
introduced in the following Section 4 is more convenient from the mathematical
point of view since there exists a universal weak prediction system, as shown
in Section 5. Section 6 introduces the notion of complexity for weak prediction
systems and uses it to strengthen the property of universality of the universal
prediction system.
The reader who is not interested in prediction can start from the mathemati-
cal notion of laws of nature in Section 2 and the deﬁnition of their complexity in
the second part of Section 6, which will prepare her to reading Section 7 about
time complexity (apart from the theorem describing connections with universal
prediction).
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The deﬁnition of the a priori time semimeasure in Section 8 is self-contained
and does not depend on the previous sections. This section contains simple
connections between the a priori time semimeasure and time complexities.
Section 9 devoted to time randomness is the nexus of this paper. Time
randomness is deﬁned in terms of time complexity (another natural deﬁnition
would be in terms of a priori time semimeasure) and serves as the basis for
prediction under conditions of considerable noise (including connections with
conformal prediction).
The last two sections, 10 and 11, explain connections of the key mathematical
concepts of this paper with the theories of conformal prediction and Kolmogorov
complexity, respectively.
2 Laws of nature as prediction systems
Not for nothing do we call the laws of nature “laws”:
the more they prohibit, the more they say.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Karl Popper
According to Popper’s [7] view of the philosophy of science, scientiﬁc laws of na-
ture should be falsiﬁable: some ﬁnite sequences of observations should disagree
with such a law, and if so, we should be able to detect the disagreement. (Pop-
per often preferred to talk about scientiﬁc theories or statements instead of laws
of nature. He did not discuss the computational details of detecting disagree-
ment; for him, it was just something that we see straight away.) The empirical
content of a law of nature is the set of its potential falsiﬁers ([7], Sections 31
and 35). We start from formalizing this notion in our toy setting, interpreting
the requirement that we should be able to detect falsiﬁcation as that we should
be able to detect it eventually.
Formally, we deﬁne a law of nature L to be a recursively enumerable preﬁx-
free subset of (X × 2)∗ (where prefix-free means that σ1 /∈ L whenever σ2 ∈
L and σ1 ❁ σ2). Intuitively, these are the potential falsiﬁers, i.e., sequences
of observations prohibited by the law of nature. The requirement of being
recursively enumerable is implicit in the notion of a falsiﬁer, and the requirement
of being preﬁx-free reﬂects the fact that extensions of prohibited sequences of
observations are automatically prohibited and there is no need to mention them
in the deﬁnition (see, however, Remark 2 below). It is convenient to allow the
vacuous law of nature ∅.
A law of nature L gives rise to a prediction system: in a situation s = (σ, x)
it predicts that the label y ∈ 2 of the new object x will be an element of
ΠL(s) := {y ∈ 2 | (s, y) /∈ L} . (1)
There are three possibilities in each situation s:
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• The law of nature makes a prediction, either 0 or 1, in situation s when
the prediction set (1) is of size 1, |ΠL(s)| = 1.
• The prediction set is empty, |ΠL(s)| = 0, which means that the law of
nature is about to be falsiﬁed (and we can even say that it has been
falsiﬁed already).
• The law of nature refrains from making a prediction when |ΠL(s)| = 2.
This can happen in two cases:
– the law of nature was falsiﬁed in past: σ′ ∈ L for some σ′ ⊑ σ;
– the law of nature has not been falsiﬁed as yet and allows (σ, (x, y))
for both y = 0 and y = 1.
Remark. The counterpart of our notion of a law of nature in probability theory
is that of a stopping time.
Remark. Our deﬁnition of a law of nature is the one that appears to us to lead
to the simplest and richest theory, but there are several viable alternatives. Let
us say that a subset L of (X× 2)∗ is an upset if the conjunction of σ1 ∈ L and
σ1 ⊑ σ2 implies σ2 ∈ L. It is clear that the deﬁnition of laws of nature as upsets
L whose frontier
{σ ∈ L | ∀σ′ ❁ σ : σ′ /∈ L}
is recursively enumerable is completely equivalent to ours; talking about fron-
tiers of upsets rather than upsets is a matter of taste. We can both narrow down
and widen up this deﬁnition in a natural way. The most restrictive deﬁnition
discussed in this remark identiﬁes a law of nature with a computable upset L
in (X× 2)∗ that is strongly co-continuable, in the sense of satisfying
∀σ /∈ L ∀x ∈ X ∃y ∈ 2 : (σ, (x, y)) /∈ L
(which is equivalent to the prediction set (1) never being empty unless the law
has been falsiﬁed). A slightly less restrictive deﬁnition is to identify a law of
nature with a computable upset that is weakly co-continuable, in the sense of
satisfying
∀σ /∈ L ∃(x, y) ∈ (X× 2) : (σ, (x, y)) /∈ L.
(Notice that a subset of (X × 2)∗ is a weakly co-continuable upset if and only
if it can be represented as the set of all ﬁnite data sequences all of whose inﬁ-
nite continuations are elements of a given open subset of (X × 2)∞; this gives
a natural one-to-one correspondence between the weakly co-continuable upsets
and the open sets in (X × 2)∞.) The main reasons we do not impose either
of the conditions of co-continuability are that we opt for simpler deﬁnitions
and that empty prediction sets are common in conformal prediction. A seri-
ous disadvantage of deﬁnitions involving the requirement of computability is
that, in non-trivial cases, they do not allow constructing universal objects (such
as universal prediction systems in Section 5 below). Dropping the two condi-
tions of co-continuability and relaxing computability to recursive enumerability
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of the frontier, we obtain our deﬁnition. Further relaxing the requirement of
computability, we can deﬁne a law of nature as a recursively enumerable upset.
This is a natural deﬁnition that ﬁts our intuition behind laws of nature even
better than our oﬃcial deﬁnition does; it also allows us to deﬁne universal pre-
dictions systems (as in Theorems 1 and 3 below). However, we do not know how
to connect it with natural counterparts of the standard notions of Kolmogorov
complexity, a priori semimeasure, and randomness (as we do for our deﬁnition
in Sections 7–9). And our oﬃcial deﬁnition still covers the practically important
case of computable upsets.
3 Strong prediction systems
The notion of a law of nature is static; experience tells us that laws of nature
eventually fail and are replaced by other laws. Popper represented his picture
of this process by formulas (“evolutionary schemas”) similar to
PS1 → TT1 → EE1 → PS2 → · · · (2)
(introduced in his 1965 talk on which [8], Chapter 6, is based and also discussed
in several other places in [8] and [9]). In response to a problem situation PS,
scientists create a tentative theory TT and then subject it to attempts at error
elimination EE, whose success leads to a new problem situation PS, after which
scientists come up with a new tentative theory TT, etc. In our toy version
of this process, tentative theories are laws of nature, problem situations are
situations in which our current law of nature becomes falsiﬁed, and there are no
active attempts at error elimination (so that error elimination simply consists
in waiting until the current law of nature becomes falsiﬁed).
If L and L′ are laws of nature, we deﬁne L ❁ L′ to mean that for any σ′ ∈ L′
there exists σ ∈ L such that σ ❁ σ′. To formalize the philosophical picture (2),
we deﬁne a strong prediction system L to be a nested sequence L1 ❁ L2 ❁ · · ·
of laws of nature L1, L2, . . . that are jointly recursively enumerable, in the sense
of the set {(σ, n) ∈ (X× 2)∗ × N | σ ∈ Ln} being recursively enumerable.
The interpretation of a strong prediction system L = (L1, L2, . . .) is that L1
is the initial law of nature used for predicting the labels of new objects until
it is falsiﬁed; as soon as it is falsiﬁed we start looking for and then using for
prediction the following law of nature L2 until it is falsiﬁed in its turn, etc.
Therefore, the prediction set in a situation s = (σ, x) is natural to deﬁne as the
set
ΠL(s) := {y ∈ 2 | (s, y) /∈ ∪
∞
n=1Ln} . (3)
As before, it is possible that ΠL(s) = ∅.
Fix a situation s = (σ, x) ∈ (X×2)∗×X. Let n = n(s) be the largest integer
such that σ has a preﬁx in Ln. It is possible that n = 0 (when s does not have
such preﬁxes), but if n ≥ 1, s will also have preﬁxes in Ln−1, . . . , L1, by the
deﬁnition of a strong prediction system. Then Ln+1 will be the current law of
nature; all earlier laws, Ln, Ln−1, . . . , L1, have been falsiﬁed. The prediction (3)
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in situation s is then interpreted as the set of all labels y that are not prohibited
by the current law Ln+1.
In the spirit of the theory of Kolmogorov complexity, we would like to have
a universal prediction system. However, we are not aware of any useful no-
tion of a universal strong prediction system. Therefore, in the next section we
will introduce a wider notion of a prediction system that does not have this
disadvantage.
4 Weak prediction systems
A weak prediction system L is deﬁned to be a sequence (not required to be
nested in any sense) L1, L2, . . . of laws of nature Ln ⊆ (X× 2)∗ that are jointly
recursively enumerable.
Remark. Popper’s evolutionary schema (2) was the simplest one that he con-
sidered; his more complicated ones, such as
PS1
ր
TTa → EEa → PS2a → · · ·
→TTb → EEb → PS2b → · · ·
ց
TTc → EEc → PS2c → · · ·
(cf. [8], pp. 243 and 287), give rise to weak rather than strong prediction systems.
In the rest of this paper we will omit “weak” in “weak prediction system”.
The most basic way of using a prediction system L for making a prediction in
situation s = (σ, x) is as follows. Decide on the maximum number N of errors
you are willing to make. Ignore all Ln apart from L1, . . . , LN in L, so that the
prediction set in situation s is
ΠNL (s) := {y ∈ 2 | ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N} : (s, y) /∈ Ln} .
Notice that this way we are guaranteed to make at most N mistakes: mak-
ing a mistake eliminates at least one law in the list of unfalsiﬁed laws among
{L1, . . . , LN}.
Similarly to the theory of conformal prediction (see, e.g., [14]), another way
of packaging L’s prediction in situation s is, instead of choosing the threshold
(or level) N in advance, to allow the user to apply her own threshold: in a
situation s, for each y ∈ 2 report the attained level
πsL(y) := min {n ∈ N | (s, y) ∈ Ln} ∈ N ∪ {∞} (4)
(with min ∅ := ∞). The user whose threshold is N will then consider y ∈ 2
with πsL(y) ≤ N as prohibited in s. Notice that the function (4) is upper
semicomputable (for a ﬁxed L).
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The strength of a prediction system L = (L1, L2, . . .) at level N ∈ N is
determined by its N -part
L≤N :=
N⋃
n=1
Ln. (5)
At levelN , the prediction system L prohibits y ∈ 2 as continuation of a situation
s if and only if (s, y) ∈ L≤N .
We will also use the limit
L<∞ :=
∞⋃
n=1
Ln (6)
of (5). Notice that L<∞ uniquely determines L if L is a strong prediction
system, but the analogous statement for weak prediction systems is false.
Remark. In motivating our deﬁnitions we have referred to views expressed in
Karl Popper’s writings. Similar views have been held by many other philoso-
phers. Popper himself regarded his evolutionary schemas as improvements and
rationalizations of the Hegelian dialectical schema. Charles Peirce’s views were
particularly close to Popper’s. He was as emphatic as Popper in insisting on
the importance of falsiﬁcation of laws of nature (as he said, “the scientiﬁc spirit
requires a man to be at all times ready to dump his whole cartload of beliefs,
the moment experience is against them” [6, pp. 46–47]). His version of Popper’s
evolutionary schema (2) is
belief – surprise – doubt – inquiry – belief
(as presented by Misak in [5, p. 11]).
5 Universal prediction
There is the logical disjunction: Either an
intrinsically improbable event will occur, or, the
prediction will [. . . ] be verified.
Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference
Ronald Fisher
The following theorem says that there exists a universal prediction system, in
the sense that it is stronger than any other prediction system if we ignore a
multiplicative increase in the number of errors made.
Theorem 1. There is a universal prediction system U , in the sense that for
any prediction system L there exists a constant c > 0 such that, for any N ,
L≤N ⊆ U≤cN . (7)
7
Proof. Let L1,L2, . . . be a recursive enumeration of all prediction systems; their
component laws of nature will be denoted (Lk1 , L
k
2 , . . .) := L
k. (Formally, we
require the set {(σ, n, k) ∈ (X×2)∗×N2 | σ ∈ Lkn} to be recursively enumerable
and the sequence L1,L2, . . . to contain all prediction systems.) For each n ∈ N,
deﬁne the nth component Un of U = (U1, U2, . . .) as follows. Let the binary
representation of n be (
a, 0, 1k−1
)
= (a, 0, 1, . . . , 1),
where a is a binary string (starting from 1) and the number of 1s in the 1, . . . , 1
is k − 1 ∈ N0 (this sentence is the deﬁnition of a = a(n) and k = k(n) in terms
of n). If the binary representation of n does not contain any 0s, a and k are
undeﬁned, and we set Un := ∅. Otherwise, set
Un := L
k
A,
where A ∈ N is the number whose binary representation is a. In other words, U
consists of the components of Lk, k ∈ N; namely, Lk1 is placed in U as U3×2k−1−1
and then Lk2 , L
k
3 , . . . are placed at intervals of 2
k:
U3×2k−1−1+2k(n−1) = L
k
n, n = 1, 2, . . . .
It is easy to see that
Lk≤N ⊆ U≤3×2k−1−1+2k(N−1), (8)
which is stronger than (7).
Let us ﬁx a universal prediction system U . We can equivalently rewrite (7)
as the inclusion between the extreme terms of
ΠcNU (s) = {y ∈ 2 | (s, y) /∈ U≤cN} ⊆ {y ∈ 2 | (s, y) /∈ L≤N} = Π
N
L (s), (9)
for all situations s. Intuitively, (9) says that the prediction sets output by the
universal prediction system are at least as precise as the prediction sets output
by any other prediction system L if we ignore a constant factor in specifying
the level N .
In terms of the attained level (4), Theorem 1 says that, as a function of s and
y, πsU (y) does not exceed π
s
L(y) to within a constant factor. Indeed, assuming
that c ∈ N in (7),
πsL(y) = min {n ∈ N | (s, y) ∈ Ln} = max {N ∈ N0 | (s, y) /∈ L≤N}+ 1
≥ max {N ∈ N0 | (s, y) /∈ U≤cN}+ 1
=
1
c
max {N ′ ∈ cN0 | (s, y) /∈ U≤N ′}+ 1
≥
1
c
max {N ′ ∈ N0 | (s, y) /∈ U≤N ′}
=
1
c
min {n ∈ N | (s, y) ∈ Un} −
1
c
=
1
c
πsU (y)−
1
c
,
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which implies
πsL(y) ≥
1
2c
πsU (y) (10)
when πsU (y) ≥ 2; and when π
s
U (y) = 1, (10) follows from π
s
L(y) ≥ 1.
If we are in a situation s = (σ, x) and one of the two πsU (y) (corresponding
to y = 0 or y = 1) is a small number, we can predict the other label: e.g., if
πsU (0) is small, we can predict that the label of x is 1, and we then have Fisher’s
disjunction: either our prediction is correct, or a rare event has occurred.
6 Complexity of prediction systems and laws of
nature
In this section we will see how the constant c in Theorem 1 depends on the pre-
diction system L. The dependence will be in terms of the algorithmic complexity
of L, which we will now deﬁne.
A description language for prediction systems is a function F mapping 2∗
to the set of all prediction systems such that the set
{(d, σ, n) ∈ 2∗ × (X× 2)∗ × N | σ ∈ Fn(d)}
is recursively enumerable, where Fn(d) is the nth law of nature in F (d), i.e.,
Fn(d) := Ln when F (d) = (L1, L2, . . .). Notice that the domain of F is 2
∗ rather
than a subset of 2∗, which is unusual for the theory of algorithmic complexity.
The effective domain dom(F ) of a description language F for prediction systems
is
dom(F ) := {d | F (d) 6= (∅, ∅, . . .)}. (11)
A prefix-free description language for prediction systems is a description lan-
guage F for prediction systems such that dom(F ) is preﬁx-free.
The complexity of a prediction system L with respect to a description lan-
guage F for prediction systems is deﬁned by
CF (L) := min {|d| | L = F (d)} ,
|d| standing for the length of d.
Theorem 2. There is a description language U for prediction systems that is
universal in the sense that for any description language F for prediction systems
there exists a constant c such that, for any prediction system L,
CU (L) ≤ CF (L) + c. (12)
There is a prefix-free description language U ′ for prediction systems that is uni-
versal in the sense that for any prefix-free description language F for prediction
systems there exists a constant c such that, for any prediction system L,
CU ′ (L) ≤ CF (L) + c.
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Proof. We will use the same (very standard) argument as in Theorem 1 and
will only prove (12). Let F k, k = 1, 2, . . . be a recursive enumeration of the
description languages for prediction systems (meaning that the set{
(d, σ, n, k) ∈ 2∗ × (X× 2)∗ × N2 | σ ∈ F kn (d)
}
is recursively enumerable and that each description language for prediction sys-
tems belongs to the sequence F 1, F 2, . . .). Let 1k0d serve as a description of
F k(d) under U (where 1k stands for the binary sequence (1, . . . , 1) consisting of
k 1s).
Let us ﬁx a universal description language U for prediction systems, call
CU (L) the plain complexity of L, and abbreviate CU (L) to C(L). Analogously,
we ﬁx a universal preﬁx-free description language U ′, call CU ′(L) the prefix
complexity of L, and abbreviate CU ′(L) to K(L).
The following theorem makes (7) uniform in L showing how c depends on L.
Theorem 3. There is a constant c > 0 such that, for any prediction system L
and any N ∈ N, the universal prediction system U satisfies
L≤N ⊆ U≤c2K(L)N . (13)
Proof. Deﬁne a prediction system V as the sequence (V1, V2, . . .) of laws of nature
such that Vn := U
′
n′(d), where U
′ is the universal preﬁx-free description language
for prediction systems, and n′ ∈ N and d ∈ 2∗ are deﬁned given n as follows:
• d is the suﬃx (if it exists) of the binary representation of n such that
←−
d
belongs to dom(U ′) (where
←−
d is the mirror image of d:
∣∣∣←−d ∣∣∣ = |d| and the
bits of
←−
d are the same as the bits of d but written in the opposite order);
• the binary representation of n′ is the preﬁx (if non-empty) of the binary
representation of n left after removing its suﬃx d.
It is clear that such n′ and d are unique when they exist; and when they do not
exist, set Vn := ∅. Then the modiﬁcation
U ′n(d) ⊆ V≤n2|d|+2|d|−1
of (8) implies, for any prediction system L,
Ln ⊆ V≤n2K(L)+2K(L)−1
(take as d the shortest description of L under U ′). This implies that (13)
holds for some prediction system V in place of U , which, when combined with
the statement of Theorem 1, implies that (13) holds for our chosen universal
prediction system U .
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Specializing the notions of plain and preﬁx complexity for a prediction sys-
tem to prediction systems of type L = (L,L, . . .), we obtain the notions of plain
and preﬁx complexity for a law of nature:
C(L) := C((L,L, . . .)),
K(L) := K((L,L, . . .)).
However, since the notion of algorithmic complexity of a law of nature will be
used in the next section as a basis for deﬁning the complexity of time, we will
also spell out the simpler direct deﬁnition.
A description language for laws of nature is a function F mapping 2∗ to the
set of preﬁx-free subsets of (X× 2)∗ such that the set
{(d, σ) ∈ 2∗ × (X× 2)∗ | σ ∈ F (d)}
is recursively enumerable. We will usually omit “for laws of nature”. Notice
that, for any description language F and any description d ∈ 2∗, F (d) is a
law of nature (formally, we use “description” to mean elements of 2∗; informally,
descriptions serve as arguments for description languages). The effective domain
dom(F ) of a description language F is
dom(F ) := {d | F (d) 6= ∅}.
A prefix-free description language is a description language F such that dom(F )
is preﬁx-free.
The complexity of a law of nature L with respect to a description language
F is deﬁned by
CF (L) := min {|d| | L = F (d)} .
The analogue of Theorem 2 continues to hold for laws of nature; we ﬁx a univer-
sal description language U , call CU (L) the plain complexity of L, and abbreviate
CU (L) to C(L); and we ﬁx a universal preﬁx-free description language U
′, call
CU ′(L) the prefix complexity of L, and abbreviate CU ′ (L) to K(L).
This is a corollary of Theorem 3 for laws of nature:
Corollary 1. There is a constant c > 0 such that, for any law of nature L, the
universal prediction system U satisfies
L ⊆ U≤c2K(L) . (14)
Proof. We again regard laws of nature L as a special case of prediction systems
identifying L with L := (L,L, . . .). It remains to apply Theorem 3 to L setting
N := 1.
A simple counting argument shows that the dependence of the right-hand
side of (13) on the complexity of L is approximately correct and cannot be
signiﬁcantly improved (if the diﬀerence between plain and preﬁx complexities is
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ignored). To state this argument in its strongest form, we will introduce a new
piece of notation: for each inﬁnite data sequence ω ∈ (X× 2)∞,
Σ(ω) :=
{
ωl | l ∈ N0
}
is the set of all ﬁnite preﬁxes of ω. Theorem 3 says that there is a constant c > 0
such that, for any K,N ∈ N, any inﬁnite data sequence ω, and any prediction
system L satisfying K(L) ≤ K,
L≤N ∩ Σ(ω) ⊆ U≤c2KN ∩ Σ(ω). (15)
The inclusion in (15) compares the predictive powers of L and U only along the
inﬁnite data sequence ω.
Theorem 4. There is a constant c > 0 such that, for any K,N ∈ N and any
infinite data sequence ω, there exists a prediction system L satisfying C(L) ≤ K
and
L≤N ∩ Σ(ω) * U≤c2KN ∩ Σ(ω). (16)
Proof. Let Lk, k ∈ N, be the strong prediction system such that Lk<∞ (deﬁned
by (6)) consists of ﬁnite data sequences whose length is divisible by 2k−1 but
not divisible by 2k (what is essential is that diﬀerent Lk make errors on disjoint
sets of ﬁnite data sequences). Take any K,N ∈ N and any ω ∈ (X × 2)∞. Set
K ′ := K−a for some constant a ∈ N, to be chosen later. The set U≤2K′N ∩Σ(ω)
contains at most 2K
′
N elements; therefore, (16) will be satisﬁed for c := 2−a, for
some L := Lk and k ≤ 2K
′
+1. It remains to notice that C(Lk) ≤ K ′+O(1) ≤ K
provided a is suﬃciently large.
We have the following corollary of Theorem 4 for laws of nature showing the
tightness (to within the diﬀerence between C and K) of Corollary 1.
Corollary 2. There is a constant c > 0 such that, for any K ∈ N and any
infinite data sequence ω, there exists a law of nature L satisfying C(L) ≤ K
and
L ∩ Σ(ω) * U≤c2K ∩ Σ(ω).
Proof. Specialize Theorem 4 to the case N := 1 and deﬁne L to be the ﬁrst
element of the prediction system L. The additive constant implicit in the deﬁ-
nition of the plain complexity C(L) can be incorporated into the constant c, as
we did in the proof of Theorem 4.
Analogously to (7) and (9), we can rewrite (13) and (14) as
Πc2
K(L)
N
U (s) ⊆ Π
N
L (s) (17)
and
Πc2
K(L)
U (s) ⊆ ΠL(s), (18)
respectively, for all situations s; (17) and (18) indicate the dependence of the
constant factor in (9) on L.
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Remark ([13]). This is a natural modiﬁcation of our deﬁnition of preﬁx-free
description languages: a description language F for laws of nature is prefix-
correct if, for all d1, d2 ∈ 2∗,
d1 ⊑ d2 =⇒ F (d1) ⊆ F (d2).
There is a universal preﬁx-correct description language U ′′ in the sense that
CU ′′ ≤ CF +O(1) for any preﬁx-correct description language F . Let us ﬁx such
a U ′′ and call K ′(F ) := CU ′′ (F ) the intermediate complexity of F .
7 Time complexity of finite data sequences
The plain time complexity and prefix time complexity of a ﬁnite data sequence
σ are deﬁned by
C(σ) := min
L∋σ
C(L), (19)
K(σ) := min
L∋σ
K(L), (20)
respectively, where L ranges over the laws of nature. (We will explain the
terminology later in this section.) We have to modify the notation C and K
slightly since we would like to be able to use the standard notation C(σ) and
K(σ) for the Kolmogorov complexity (plain and preﬁx) of σ; we will also use
C(n) and K(n) to denote the Kolmogorov complexity (plain or preﬁx) of an
integer n.
The following simple result is useful for discussing the interpretation of C(σ)
and K(σ).
Theorem 5. For any finite data sequence σ,
C(σ) ≤ C(|σ|) +O(1), (21)
K(σ) ≤ K(|σ|) +O(1). (22)
Proof. If F is any description language (preﬁx-free or not) for nonnegative in-
tegers, we can deﬁne a description language F ′ for laws of nature by setting
F ′(d) :=
{
(X× 2)F (d) if F (d) is deﬁned
∅ if not.
Since
CF ′
(
(X× 2)|σ|
)
= CF (|σ|),
(21) follows by setting F := U and (22) follows by setting F := U ′.
Theorem 5 gives a trivial bound on the time complexity of σ: it is the
complexity of the length of σ (i.e., of the time of the last observation in σ
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assuming that the observations are taken at times 1, 2, . . .). We can say that
both C(σ) and K(σ) measure the complexity of the time of the last observation
in σ when we are given the observations themselves as an oracle (with the
observations disclosed sequentially, so that we can’t just count them). As we
will see later (see Theorems 6 and 10 below), these measures of complexity can
be used to determine whether being in the situation of having just observed the
last observation in σ is a rare event1. For the purpose of prediction, having such
a measure of complexity is important since our prediction system can be forgiven
for giving a wrong prediction when a rare event happens (cf. the epigraph about
“Fisher’s disjunction” to Section 5).
Remark. The length of a ﬁnite data sequence σ can be interpreted as the
physical time of the last observation in σ. In probability theory, physical time is
often changed; e.g., it can be replaced by intrinsic time reﬂecting the intensity
at which various events happen (in a probability-free setting, this was done
in, e.g., [15], where physical time was replaced by quadratic variation). The
stopping times (see Remark 2) corresponding to physical time consist of all
ﬁnite data sequences of the same length. For the more general notion of time,
we can regard the last observations in the ﬁnite data sequences in an arbitrary
stopping time (law of nature) as happening at the same moment in time. This
is another justiﬁcation for calling (19)–(20) the time complexity of σ.
Remark. In the usual jargon of Kolmogorov complexity, we can say that the
complexity (either plain or preﬁx) of σ is the minimal complexity (of the same
kind) of a binary program that enumerates some preﬁx-free set containing σ.
The following theorem describes a connection with the universal prediction
system; remember that log is binary logarithm.
Theorem 6. There is a constant c > 0 such that, for all N ,
{σ | C(σ) ≤ logN − c} ⊆ U≤N ⊆ {σ | C(σ) ≤ logN + c}. (23)
Proof. To check the left-hand inclusion in (23), it suﬃces to deﬁne a prediction
system L such that, for all ﬁnite data sequences σ, σ ∈ L≤2k+1 where k := C(σ).
Let U be the universal description language for laws of nature: CU = C. We
can set L := (L1, L2, . . .), where Ln is deﬁned to be F (d) for d obtained from
the binary representation of n by removing the leading 1.
To check the right-hand inclusion in (23), it suﬃces to deﬁne a description
language F for laws of nature such that CF (σ) ≤ logN whenever σ ∈ U≤N , for
any N . Deﬁne F (d), where d ∈ 2∗, as Un, where n is the natural number whose
binary representation is 1 followed by d. If σ ∈ U≤N , σ will belong to a law
of nature whose description is of length at most ⌊logN⌋, which completes the
proof of this inclusion.
1For the reader familiar with Shafer’s ([11], Section 1.7) distinction between Humean and
Moivrean events, we are talking about events of the former kind.
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We can interpret (23) by saying that U≤N coincides with {σ | C(σ) ≤ logN}
if we are allowed to vary the threshold logN by adding a constant (positive or
negative); this qualiﬁcation is natural as time complexity is deﬁned only to
within an additive constant.
The next result gives an even simpler connection.
Theorem 7. When s ∈ (X×2)∗×X ranges over the situations and y ∈ 2 over
the labels,
log πsU (y) = C((s, y)) +O(1).
Proof. This follows immediately from (23):
log πsU (y) = min{logn | (s, y) ∈ Un} = min{logN | (s, y) ∈ U≤N}
= min{logN | C((s, y)) ≤ logN}+O(1) = C((s, y)) +O(1),
where n and N range over N.
And the following theorem gives obvious connections between the two com-
plexities.
Theorem 8.
C(σ) ≤ K(σ) +O(1)
K(σ) ≤ C(σ) + 2 logC(σ) +O(1).
Proof. The ﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that a preﬁx-free description
language is a description language. The second inequality follows from the fact
that any description d can be turned into a preﬁx-free description by preﬁxing
it by the following preﬁx-free description of the length |d| of d: double each bit
of the binary representation of |d| and add the string (0, 1) as suﬃx.
Remark ([13]). We can complement (19) and (20) by K′(σ) := minL∋σK
′(L),
where K ′ is as deﬁned in Remark 6. We will refer to K′(σ) as the intermediate
time complexity of σ; notice that
C−O(1) ≤ K′ ≤ K+O(1).
8 A priori time semimeasure
We can also deﬁne an analogue of Levin’s a priori semimeasure (see, e.g., [12],
Section 7.33) for time. A time semimeasure is a function P : (X× 2)∗ → [0, 1]
such that, for all inﬁnite data sequences ω,
∞∑
l=0
P (ωl) ≤ 1.
Theorem 9. There is a largest to within a constant factor lower semicomputable
time semimeasure.
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Proof. It is easy to check that there exists a sequence Pk, k = 1, 2, . . ., of
semicomputable time semimeasures that is jointly lower semicomputable, in the
sense of the function (k, σ) 7→ Pk(σ) being lower semicomputable, and universal,
in the sense of containing every lower semicomputable time semimeasure. For
any such sequence, the average
M :=
∞∑
k=1
2−kPk
will be a largest to within a constant factor lower semicomputable time semimea-
sure.
Let us ﬁx a largest to within a constant factor lower semicomputable time
semimeasure M and call it the a priori time semimeasure. We will use the
notation M for the standard a priori semimeasure on N0; it is well known that
− logM coincides with preﬁx complexity K to within an additive constant (see,
e.g., [12], Theorem 7.29). For the time counterparts of M and K we will only
state a weaker result.
Theorem 10. C−O(1) ≤ − logM ≤ K+O(1).
Proof. To check the inequality − logM ≤ K + O(1), it suﬃces to check that
2−K is a time semimeasure (its lower semicomputability follows from the upper
semicomputability of K). Fix an inﬁnite data sequence ω. For each l, let Ll be
the simplest, in the sense of K, law of nature containing ωl. By the deﬁnition
of a law of nature all Ll are pairwise distinct, and so we have
∞∑
l=0
2−K(ω
l) =
∞∑
l=0
2−K(Ll) ≤
∑
L
2−K(L) ≤ 1, (24)
where the last sum is over all laws of nature L (the last inequality is obvious,
but a detailed proof can be found in, e.g., [12], Theorem 7.27).
To check the opposite inequality C ≤ − logM + O(1), it suﬃces to de-
ﬁne a description language F for laws of nature such that minL∋σ CF (L) ≤
− logM(σ) + O(1). For each threshold k ∈ N0, we can enumerate (in a com-
putable manner) all data sequences σ satisfying M(σ) > 2−k (as M is lower
semicomputable, we will be able to detectM(σ) > 2−k eventually); let σ1, σ2, . . .
be such an enumeration (the sequence σ1, σ2, . . . can be ﬁnite and even empty,
as it is for k = 0). Order the 2k binary strings in 2k lexicographically. For
n = 1, 2, . . .: assign to σn as its description the smallest element of 2
k that does
not serve as description for any of σ1, . . . , σn−1 that is comparable with σn w.r.
to ⊑ (in particular, σ1 has 0k = (0, . . . , 0) as its description). Since, for each
inﬁnite data sequence ω, M(ωl) > 2−k holds for at most 2k (and even 2k − 1)
ls, we will never run out of descriptions when following this procedure. Deﬁne
F (d), where d ∈ 2k, to be the set of all σ having d as their description; by con-
struction, F (d) is a law of nature and F is a description language (remember
that the procedure is repeated for all k ∈ N0). Since
M(σ) > 2−k =⇒ CF (σ) ≤ k
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for all σ ∈ (X × 2)∗ and k ∈ N0, we have CF ≤ − logM + 1 and, therefore,
C ≤ − logM+O(1).
In fact, Alexander Shen pointed out that the standard connection between
M and K, K = − logM +O(1), does not carry over to their time counterparts.
(Shen’s observation is a version of another standard result in the theory of
Kolmogorov complexity.)
Theorem 11 (A. Shen). It is not true that K = − logM+O(1).
Proof. Suppose that, in fact, K = − logM+O(1). Fix an object x ∈ X and two
labels a, b ∈ Y. Set A := (x, a) ∈ Z, α := (A,A, . . .) ∈ Z∞, and B := (x, b) ∈ Z.
For each n ∈ N, consider the following n ﬁnite data sequences:
αnBα1, αnBα2, . . . , αnBαn.
Since there is a time semimeasure P satisfying P (αnBαk) = 1/n, for all n ∈
N and all k = 1, . . . , n, we have M(αnBαk) ≥ 1/(cn), for all n ∈ N and
all k = 1, . . . , n, c standing for a positive universal constant (with diﬀerent
occurrences of c referring to possibly diﬀerent positive universal constants). By
our assumption, 2−K(α
n
Bα
k) ≥ 1/(cn), for all n ∈ N and all k = 1, . . . , n.
Remember that
∑
L
2−K(L) ≤ 1, where the sum is over all laws of nature (we
have already used this: see (24)). The series
∑
L
2−K(L) contains at least n
terms 2−K(L) ≥ 1/(cn) (since laws of natures containing αnBαk and αnBαk
′
are necessarily diﬀerent when k 6= k′). The series is positive, and so its sum will
not change if we rearrange its terms. Let us sort them in the decreasing order.
The nth largest term will be at least 1/(cn), and therefore
∑
n
1/n =∞ implies∑
L
2−K(L) =∞. This contradiction concludes the proof.
Remark ([1]). As shown by Mikhail Andreev, it is also not true that K′ =
− logM + O(1), where K′ is intermediate time complexity, as deﬁned in Re-
mark 7. The proof is much more diﬃcult and can be found in [1].
9 Time randomness
In the usual theory of Kolmogorov complexity the notion of algorithmic ran-
domness is as important as that of algorithmic complexity (and perhaps was
the main motivation behind Kolmogorov’s introduction of algorithmic complex-
ity). There are many versions of algorithmic randomness, and in this paper we
will brieﬂy discuss only the time analogue of Kolmogorov’s original deﬁnition
|σ|−C(σ) of the randomness deﬁciency of a binary string σ of length |σ| (given,
somewhat implicitly, in [3], Section 4) and, later on (see Theorem 13), the time
analogue of Martin-Lo¨f’s [4] deﬁnition of randomness.
The time randomness deficiency of a ﬁnite data sequence σ ∈ (X × 2)∗ is
deﬁned to be
D(σ) := log |σ| −C(σ).
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(We take log |σ| instead of Kolmogorov’s |σ| in view of Theorem 5: whereas the
trivial upper bound on plain Kolmogorov complexity is C(σ) ≤ |σ| +O(1), the
trivial upper bound on plain time complexity is
C(σ) ≤ C(|σ|) +O(1) ≤ log |σ|+O(1).)
Informally, we can rewrite (23) as
U≤N ≈ {σ | C(σ) ≤ logN}.
We could have deﬁned the universal prediction system by
U ′m := {σ | C(σ) ≤ m}
(with m in place of logN). This deﬁnition would be especially useful in situa-
tions without noise where we can expect to make a ﬁnite number of prediction
errors over an inﬁnite data sequence. In situations where there is noise at a
more or less constant level for each observation (which is typical under the as-
sumption, prevalent in machine learning and nonparametric statistics, that the
observations are independent and identically distributed), it may be more useful
to replace C by D and set, for each threshold m ∈ N0,
∆m := {σ | D(σ) > m}.
The corresponding prediction sets are
Π∆m(s) := {y ∈ 2 | (s, y) /∈ ∆m} = {y ∈ 2 | D((s, y)) ≤ m} .
In a situation s = (σ, x), the prediction system ∆m predicts that the label y ∈ 2
of x will be an element of Π∆m(s). The following simple result shows that the
rate at which this prediction system makes errors is less than 2−m.
Theorem 12. For each infinite data sequence ω = ((x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . .), each
l ∈ N, and each m ∈ N0,∣∣{i ∈ {1, . . . , l} | yi /∈ Π∆m(ωi−1, xi)}∣∣ = ∣∣{i ∈ {1, . . . , l} | ωi ∈ ∆m}∣∣ < 2−ml.
Proof. If the prediction system ∆m makes an error when predicting yi, i.e.,
yi /∈ Π∆m(ω
i−1, xi), we have D(ω
i) > m, and so
C(ωi) < log i−m ≤ log l −m.
The number of such i does not exceed the number of all descriptions of length
less than log l−m, i.e., does not exceed 2log l−m − 1 < 2−ml.
In the rest of this section we will explore more systematically prediction
systems of the type ∆m. (Notice that, formally, they are not even weak predic-
tion systems as deﬁned in Section 4.) A randomness-type prediction system is
a jointly enumerable family Λ of sets Λm ⊆ (X × 2)
∗ of ﬁnite data sequences
such that:
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• Λm are nested: Λ0 ⊇ Λ1 ⊇ Λ2 ⊇ · · · ;
• for all m ∈ N0, l ∈ N, and ω ∈ (X× 2)∞,∣∣{i ∈ {1, . . . , l} | ωi ∈ Λm}∣∣ ≤ 2−ml. (25)
Theorem 12 says that ∆ is a randomness-type prediction system. It is easy to
see that there is a universal randomness-type prediction system:
Theorem 13. There exists a randomness-type prediction system D such that,
for any randomness-type prediction system Λ, there exists c ∈ N such that, for
all m ∈ N0, Λm+c ⊆ Dm.
Proof. Notice that we can enumerate all randomness-type prediction systems
Λ1,Λ2, . . ., in the sense that there is a recursively enumerable set
Λ ⊆ (X× 2)∗ × N2
such that:
1. For any k, the sequence (Λkm)
∞
m=1, where
Λkm := {σ ∈ (X× 2)
∗ | (σ,m, k) ∈ Λ}
is a randomness-type prediction system.
2. Any randomness-type prediction system coincides, for some k, with the
sequence (Λkm)
∞
m=1.
(The existence of such Λ follows from the existence of such a set Λ′ when item 1
is ignored and the fact that we can enumerate the elements of Λ′ one by one in-
cluding each of them into Λ if and only if the inclusion does not violate item 1.)
We can then combine all these randomness-type prediction systems into D set-
ting
Dm :=
∞⋃
k=1
Λkm+k. (26)
We will get a randomness-type prediction system, since
∣∣{i ∈ {1, . . . , l} | ωi ∈ Dm}∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
∞⋃
k=1
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , l} | ωi ∈ Λkm+k
}∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∞∑
k=1
∣∣{i ∈ {1, . . . , l} | ωi ∈ Λkm+k}∣∣
≤
∞∑
k=1
2−m−kl = 2−ml,
and this system is obviously universal.
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Let us ﬁx a randomness-type prediction system D satisfying the condition
in Theorem 13 and call it the universal randomness-type prediction system; set,
for any situation s and any m ∈ N0,
ΠDm(s) := {y ∈ 2 | (s, y) /∈ Dm} .
A crude connection of D with our previous deﬁnition is given in the following
theorem.
Theorem 14. There exists c > 0 such that, for any finite data sequence σ ∈
(X× 2)l−1 (for any l ∈ N), any x ∈ X, and any threshold m ∈ N,
Πcl2
−m
m
2
U ((σ, x)) ⊆ ΠDm((σ, x)). (27)
This theorem asserts that the prediction set output by the universal predic-
tion system is at least as precise as the prediction set output by the universal
randomness-type prediction system if we increase slightly the allowed percent-
age of errors: from 2−m to c2−mm2. It involves not just multiplying by a
constant (as in, e.g., (9)) but also the term m2, which is logarithmic in the
allowed percentage of errors 2−m for Dm.
By Theorem 12, Theorem 14 will stay true if we replace the right-hand side
ΠDm((σ, x)) of (27) by Π∆m((σ, x)); moreover,
ΠDm((σ, x)) ⊆ Π∆m+c((σ, x))
for a constant c.
Proof of Theorem 14. Let us replace (27) by the equivalent
σ ∈ Dm =⇒ σ ∈ U≤c|σ|2−mm2 .
Deﬁne a prediction system L = (L1, L2, . . .) as, essentially, Dm; formally:
• The law of nature L1 contains only ﬁnite data sequences σ ∈ Dm of length
at most 2m. This set if preﬁx-free by the deﬁnition of a randomness-type
prediction system: indeed, (25) shows that, for any inﬁnite data sequence
ω, at most 2−m2m = 1 element of L1 is a preﬁx of ω.
• The next 2 laws of nature (L2 and L3) contain only ﬁnite data sequences
σ ∈ Dm of length in the range 2m + 1 to 2m+1, and we will deﬁne them
similarly to the proof of Theorem 10. Enumerate, in a computable manner,
all such data sequences σ (σ ∈ Dm and |σ| ∈ [2m+1, 2m+1]); let σ1, σ2, . . .
be such an enumeration. For n = 1, 2, . . .: include σn into the law of nature
(L2 or L3) with the smallest index that does not already contain data
sequences comparable with σn in the sense of the order ⊑ (in particular,
σ1 ∈ L2). Two laws of nature (L2 and L3) are suﬃcient since, by (25),
each inﬁnite data sequence ω has at most 2−m2m+1 = 2 elements of Dm
with length in the range [2m+1, 2m+1] (and even [0, 2m+1]) as its preﬁxes.
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• The next 4 laws of nature (L4 to L7) contain only ﬁnite data sequences
σ ∈ Dm of length in the range 2m+1 + 1 to 2m+2. Enumerate, in a
computable manner, all data sequences σ ∈ Dm whose length is in this
range; let σ1, σ2, . . . be such an enumeration. For n = 1, 2, . . .: include σn
into the law of nature (L4 to L7) with the smallest index that does not
already contain data sequences comparable with σn in the sense of the
order ⊑. We will never run out of the available laws of nature (L4 to L7)
by the deﬁnition of a randomness-type prediction system: see (25).
• And so on.
Any data sequence σ ∈ Dm whose length l is in the range 2m+i−1 + 1 to 2m+i,
i ∈ N, will be included in one of the 2i laws of nature L2i to L2i+1−1, and so
σ ∈ L≤2i+1−1 ⊆ L≤22−m(l−1)−1.
In combination with Theorem 3, we obtain
σ ∈ U≤c12K(L)2−ml
for a constant c1 > 0. Therefore, our task reduces to checking that
2K(m) ≤ c2m
2
for a constant c2 > 0. Since 2
−K(m) is the universal semimeasure on the positive
integers (see, e.g., [12], Theorem 7.29), we even have
2K(m) ≤ c3m(logm)(log logm) · · · (log · · · logm),
where the product contains all factors that are greater than 1 (see [10], Ap-
pendix A).
Remark. The proof shows that the inclusion (27) can be strengthened to
Πcl2
K(m)−m
U ((σ, x)) ⊆ ΠDm((σ, x)).
Next we show how the constant c in Theorem 13 depends on Λ. First
we give a standard deﬁnition of preﬁx complexity adapted to randomness-type
prediction systems.
A description language for randomness-type prediction systems is a function
F mapping 2∗ to the set of all randomness-type prediction systems such that
the set
{(d, σ,m) ∈ 2∗ × (X× 2)∗ × N | σ ∈ Fm(d)}
is recursively enumerable, where Fm(d) is themth set in F (d), i.e., Fm(d) := Λm
when F (d) = (Λ1,Λ2, . . .). The effective domain dom(F ) of a description lan-
guage F for randomness-type prediction systems is (11). A prefix-free descrip-
tion language for randomness-type prediction systems is a description language
F for randomness-type prediction systems such that dom(F ) is preﬁx-free.
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The complexity of a randomness-type prediction system Λ with respect to a
description language F for randomness-type prediction systems is deﬁned by
CF (Λ) := min {|d| | Λ = F (d)} .
Analogously to Theorem 2 (but using the fact that we can enforce item 1 on
p. 19) we can prove:
Theorem 15. There is a description language U for randomness-type prediction
systems that is universal in the sense that for any description language F for
randomness-type prediction systems there exists a constant c such that, for any
randomness-type prediction system Λ,
CU (Λ) ≤ CF (Λ) + c.
There is a prefix-free description language U ′ for randomness-type prediction
systems that is universal in the sense that for any prefix-free description language
F for randomness-type prediction systems there exists a constant c such that,
for any randomness-type prediction system Λ,
CU ′(Λ) ≤ CF (Λ) + c.
We ﬁx a universal description language U for randomness-type prediction
systems and call C(Λ) := CU (Λ) the plain complexity of Λ. And we ﬁx a univer-
sal preﬁx-free description language U ′ for randomness-type prediction systems
and call K(Λ) := CU ′(Λ) the prefix complexity of Λ.
Theorem 16. There exists a constant c ∈ N such that, for any randomness-type
prediction system Λ and any m ∈ N0, Λm+K(Λ)+c ⊆ Dm.
Proof. Let U ′ be our chosen universal preﬁx-free description language for
randomness-type prediction systems. Analogously to the proof of Theorem 13,
we can then combine all randomness-type prediction systems into one system
D′ by setting
D′m :=
⋃
d∈2∗
U ′m+|d|(d) (28)
(cf. (26)). We again get a randomness-type prediction system:
∣∣{i ∈ {1, . . . , l} | ωi ∈ D′m}∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
⋃
d∈2∗
{
i ∈ {1, . . . , l} | ωi ∈ U ′m+|d|(d)
}∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
d∈dom(U ′)
∣∣∣{i ∈ {1, . . . , l} | ωi ∈ U ′m+|d|(d)}∣∣∣
≤
∑
d∈dom(U ′)
2−m−|d|l ≤ 2−ml.
The inclusion Λm+K(Λ) ⊆ D
′
m now follows from Λ = U
′(d) for some d ∈ 2K(Λ).
The addend “ + c” allows us to replace the randomness-type prediction system
D′ deﬁned by (28) by our chosen universal randomness-type prediction system
D.
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In conclusion of this section we will reword our deﬁnition of a universal
prediction system to make it more similar to that of a universal randomness-type
prediction system. A complexity-type prediction system is a jointly enumerable
family Λ of sets Λm ⊆ (X×2)∗ of ﬁnite data sequences such that, for all m ∈ N0
and ω ∈ (X× 2)∞, ∣∣{i ∈ N | ωi ∈ Λm}∣∣ ≤ 2m. (29)
Theorem 17. There exists a complexity-type prediction system V such that, for
any complexity-type prediction system Λ, there exists c ∈ N such that, for all
m ∈ N0, Λm ⊆ Vm+c.
Fix a complexity-type prediction system V satisfying the condition in Theo-
rem 17 and call it the universal complexity-type prediction system. The following
analogue of Theorem 6 shows that this is not an essentially new notion.
Theorem 18. There is a constant c > 0 such that, for all m ∈ N0,
{σ | C(σ) ≤ m− c} ⊆ Vm ⊆ {σ | C(σ) ≤ m+ c}. (30)
Proof. The left-hand inclusion in (30) is obvious. The right-hand inclusion is
witnessed by the following description language for laws of nature. Enumerate
in a computable manner all ﬁnite data sequences σ1, σ2, . . . in Vm. Order all
binary strings in 2m lexicographically. Assign 0m (i.e., the sequence (0, . . . , 0) of
length m) to σ1 as its description. For i = 2, 3, . . ., assign to σi as its description
the ﬁrst string in 2m that has not being assigned as yet to the strings among
σ1, . . . , σi−1 that are comparable with σi. The ﬁnite data sequences with the
same description now form a law of nature with that description. Repeat for all
m ∈ N0.
The only thing that remains to be checked is that we will never run out
of strings in 2m. Let us check this carefully. It is convenient to think of the
elements of 2m as colours, and our goal is to show that we will never run out of
the 2m available colours. We look at the set (X×2)∗ of all ﬁnite data sequences
as a tree (rooted at ✷ and with σ and σ′ connected with an edge when σ ❁ σ′
but there is no σ′′ such that σ ❁ σ′′ ❁ σ′). Siblings are non-empty ﬁnite data
sequences that diﬀer only in their last element. Let us ﬁx some stage i of the
construction in the previous paragraph; at the beginning of this stage we have
a partial colouring of the tree (X × 2)∗: the vertices σ1, . . . , σi−1 have been
coloured, and our task is to colour σi. For each vertex σ, let Tσ be the set of all
colours used in the tree rooted at σ, and Pσ be the set of all colours used along
the path from the root ✷ to σ (not including σ). Notice the following properties
of our construction:
1. The colours of comparable vertices are diﬀerent.
2. If a vertex σ gets colour d, then each smaller color is used either for a
predecessor of σ or for a descendant of σ.
3. If σ is a vertex (coloured or not), then the sets Tσ and Pσ are disjoint (by
Property 1), and Tσ is an initial segment in the complement 2
d \Pσ of Pσ.
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Indeed, if a colour appears in Tσ, it is the colour of some vertex σ
′ ⊒ σ,
and so all smaller colours appear either before σ′ (therefore, in Pσ or Tσ)
or after σ′ (therefore, in Tσ).
4. The sets Tσ and Tσ′ for any two siblings σ and σ
′ are comparable with
respect to inclusion. Indeed, they are two initial segments of the same
complement.
5. For each vertex σ the total number of colours used in Tσ is minimal, in
the sense of being equal to the maximal number of coloured vertices on
the paths in Tσ. This can be shown by an inductive argument using the
previous property.
The last property, in combination with (29), shows that we will have at least
one colour left for σi.
10 Universal conformal prediction under the IID
assumption
Up to this point our exposition has been completely probability-free, but in this
section we will consider the special case where the data are generated in the IID
manner. For basic deﬁnitions of the theory of conformal prediction see, e.g.,
[14]. For simplicity, we will only consider computable conformity measures that
take values in the set Q of rational numbers. Remember that D is the universal
randomness-type prediction system, as introduced in the previous section; let
us set Dm := (X × 2)∗ for m < 0 (i.e., we include all ﬁnite data sequences in
Dm for negative m).
Theorem 19. Let Γ be a conformal predictor based on a computable conformity
measure taking values in Q. Then there exists c ∈ N such that, for almost all
infinite data sequences ω = ((x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . .) ∈ (X×2)∞ and all significance
levels ǫ ∈ (0, 1), from some l on we will have
ΠD⌊− log ǫ⌋−c((ω
l−1, xl)) ⊆ Γ
ǫ((ωl−1, xl)). (31)
This theorem says that the prediction set output by the universal
randomness-type prediction system is at least as precise as the prediction
set output by Γ, to within the usual additive constant.
Proof of Theorem 19. Without loss of generality we can and will assume ǫ ∈
(0, 1/2). For each such ǫ set m := ⌊− log ǫ⌋ − 1. (Intuitively, we replace ǫ by a
new signiﬁcance level 2−m, which we make at least twice as large as the original
ǫ.) Let Λm be Γ
2−m forced to satisfy (25); formally, Λm contains only ﬁnite
data sequences σ such that Γ2
−m
makes an error when predicting the last label
in σ, and Λ is deﬁned by induction ﬁrst on m and then on the length of σ as
follows: σ is included in Λm if and only if:
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• σ is included in all Λi, i < m (this condition is satisﬁed automatically if
m = 1);
• the condition (25) is satisﬁed, where l is the length of σ and ω is an inﬁnite
continuation of σ.
By the standard validity property of conformal predictors ([14], Corollary 1.1),
we will have
ΠΛm((ω
l−1, xl)) ⊆ Γ
ǫ((ωl−1, xl))
from some l on almost surely.
Remark. The proof shows that we can replace the c in (31) by c+K(Γ), where
c now does not depend on Γ and K(Γ) is the smallest preﬁx complexity of the
programs for computing the conformity measure on which Γ is based.
11 The theory of Kolmogorov complexity
In this section we will discuss the theory of Kolmogorov complexity as a special
case of our theory. We obtain the former by taking X and the label space (2 in
this paper) of size one. More generally, the theory of Kolmogorov complexity
embeds into our theory when we ﬁx an object and a label and only consider
sequences of identical observations with those object and label. Therefore, let
us ﬁx an element x of X and a label, say 0.
Let o ∈ (X × 2)∗ be the inﬁnite data sequence ((x, 0), (x, 0), . . .) consisting
of identical observations (x, 0).
Theorem 20.
C(on) = C(n) +O(1), (32)
K(on) = K(n) +O(1),
− logM(on) = − logM(n) +O(1).
Proof. We will only prove (32); the other two relations can be proved similarly.
Reinterpreting a description of n ∈ N as a description of the law of nature
(X × 2)n, we obtain the inequality ≤ in (32). (Alternatively, we can notice
that (32) is a special case of the inequality ≤ of (21).) And reinterpreting a
description of a law of nature L as a description of the length of the only element
of L ∩ Σ(o), we obtain the inequality ≥ in (32).
Combining Theorem 20 with the standard fact that K(n) = − logM(n) +
O(1) (e.g., [12], Theorem 7.29), we can see that Theorem 10 can be improved
when restricted to Σ(o): in this case − logM = K + O(1). Unfortunately, the
equality cannot be extended to all ﬁnite data sequences: see Theorem 11.
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12 Conclusion
In this paper we have ignored the computational resources, ﬁrst of all, the
required computation time and space (memory). Developing versions of our
deﬁnitions and results taking into account the time of computations is a natural
next step. In analogy with the theory of Kolmogorov complexity, we expect that
the simplest and most elegant results will be obtained for computational models
that are more ﬂexible than Turing machines, such as Kolmogorov–Uspensky
algorithms and Scho¨nhage machines.
An interesting open question is whether Theorem 10 can be improved to
− logM = K + O(1) by modifying the deﬁnition of preﬁx time complexity
(Theorem 11 says that a modiﬁcation is necessary, and Remark 8 shows that
intermediate time complexity does not work). Another open question is whether
plain complexity C can be improved to (or almost to) preﬁx complexity K in
Theorem 4.
More open questions are raised by the deﬁnition of universal randomness-
type prediction systems in Section 9: how can such prediction systems be char-
acterized in terms of other notions (such as plain and preﬁx time complexity,
time randomness deﬁciency, and a priori time semimeasure) introduced in this
paper or in terms of similar notions? (In Theorem 14 we gave only the most
obvious connection.)
Acknowledgments
We thank the anonymous referees of the conference and journal versions of this
paper for helpful comments. In particular, comments made by the referees of
the journal version have led to Remarks 2 and 7, and we especially appreciate
their generosity in ﬁlling a gap in the proof of Theorem 18. This work has been
supported by the Air Force Oﬃce of Scientiﬁc Research (grant “Semantic Com-
pletions”), EPSRC (grant EP/K033344/1), and the EU Horizon 2020 Research
and Innovation programme (grant 671555).
References
[1] Mikhail Andreev and Alexander Shen. Stopping time complexity, 2017.
Unpublished manuscript.
[2] Ronald A. Fisher. Statistical Methods and Scientific Inference. Hafner,
New York, third edition, 1973.
[3] Andrei N. Kolmogorov. Three approaches to the quantitative deﬁni-
tion of information. Problems of Information Transmission, 1:1–7, 1965.
Russian original: Три подхода к определению понятия “количество
информации”.
[4] Per Martin-Lo¨f. The deﬁnition of random sequences. Information and
Control, 9:602–619, 1966.
26
[5] Cheryl Misak. Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914). In Cheryl Misak, editor,
The Cambridge Companion to Peirce, chapter 1, pages 1–26. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
[6] Charles S. Peirce. The scientiﬁc attitude and fallibilism. In Justus Buchler,
editor, Philosophical Writings of Peirce, chapter 4, pages 285–318. Dover,
New York, 1955.
[7] Karl R. Popper. Logik der Forschung. Springer, Vienna, 1934. English
translation: The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Hutchinson, London, 1959.
[8] Karl R. Popper. Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. Claren-
don Press, Oxford, revised edition, 1979. First edition: 1972.
[9] Karl R. Popper. All Life is Problem Solving. Abingdon, Routledge, 1999.
[10] Jorma Rissanen. A universal prior for integers and estimation by minimum
description length. Annals of Statistics, 11:416–431, 1983.
[11] Glenn Shafer. The Art of Causal Conjecture. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
1996.
[12] Alexander Shen. Around Kolmogorov complexity: Basic notions and re-
sults. In Vladimir Vovk, Harris Papadopoulos, and Alexander Gammer-
man, editors,Measures of Complexity: Festschrift for Alexey Chervonenkis,
chapter 7, pages 75–115. Springer, Cham, 2015.
[13] Alexander Shen. Private communications, 2016–2017.
[14] Vladimir Vovk. The basic conformal prediction framework. In Vineeth N.
Balasubramanian, Shen-Shyang Ho, and Vladimir Vovk, editors, Confor-
mal Prediction for Reliable Machine Learning: Theory, Adaptations, and
Applications, chapter 1, pages 3–19. Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2014.
[15] Vladimir Vovk. Continuous-time trading and the emergence of probabil-
ity. Technical Report arXiv:0904.4364v4 [math.PR], arXiv.org e-Print
archive, May 2015. Journal version: Finance and Stochastics, 16:561–609,
2012.
27
